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Abstract 
This paper critically examines the Greenspan-Summers-IMF thesis concerning 
the Asian crisis, which suggested that the fundamental causes of the Asian crisis 
lay in the microeconomic behavior of economic agents in these societies – in 
the  Asian  way  of  doing  business.  The  paper  concentrates  on  corporate 
governance and competition in emerging markets and outlines the international 
significance of these issues in the context of the New International Financial 
Architecture and the Doha Development Round at the WTO. It reviews new 
analyses and fresh evidence on corporate governance, corporate finance and on 
competition in emerging and mature markets, to suggest that the basic thesis 
above is not valid and the consequent policy proposals are therefore deeply 
flawed.  
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Corporate Governance, Competition and Finance: Re-thinking lessons 
from the Asian Crisis   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This  paper  examines  micro-economic  behaviour  of  economic  agents  – 
corporations, financial institutions and governments in emerging economies. It 
focuses specifically on issues of corporate governance, financing of corporate 
growth as well as those relating to the nature and degree of competition in these 
countries.  Such  questions  have  not  previously  received  much  attention  in 
emerging  economies.  The  emphasis  in  these  countries  as  well  as  in  the 
development  literature  has  generally  been  on  macroeconomic  issues  of 
aggregate savings and investment, economic growth, balance of payments etc. 
Micro-economic issues are certainly discussed but largely this is in relation to 
cost  benefit  analysis  of  government  and  private  sector  projects
1.  There  has, 
however,  been  scarce  recognition  of  the  fact  that  economic  development  is 
actually carried out by organisations and by corporations, large and small. The 




However, the Asian crisis of 1997-2000 has radically changed the research and 
policy agenda for emerging markets. As a consequence of this crisis, as well as 
those  in  Russia,  Brazil,  Argentina  etc.,  issues  of  corporate  governance  and 
behaviour, the relationship between corporations and financial institutions as 
well  as  questions  relating  to  the  intensity  of  competition  now  command 
international attention. A main reason for these changed priorities has arguably 
been the important thesis, concerning the Asian crisis, first advanced by leading 
U.S. policymakers notably Alan Greenspan (1998) and Larry Summers (1998), 
and developed further by the IMF (see references below). Alan Greenspan, the 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in his 1998 testimony to a Congressional 
Committee suggested that, in the last decade or so, the world has observed “a 
consensus towards, for want of a better term, the Western form of free-market 
capitalism  as  the  model  which  should  govern  how  each  individual  country 
should run its economy…We saw the breakdown of the Berlin wall in 1989 and 
the massive shift away from central planning towards free market capitalist 
types of structures.  Concurrent to that was the really quite dramatic, very strong 
growth in what appeared to be a competing capitalist-type system in Asia.  And 
as a consequence of  that, you had developments of types of structures which I 
believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you could not demonstrate that so 
long  as  growth  was  going  at  10  percent  a  year”
3  [italics  added].  Similarly, 
Summers (1998) stated: “(this crisis) is profoundly different because it has its 
roots not in improvidence but in economic structures.  The problems that must   2
be fixed are much more microeconomic than macroeconomic, and involve the 
private sector more and the public sector less.” [italics added].  Greenspan and 
Summers’ structuralist view of the crisis was reflected in the IMF’s (1998a, 




 Essentially, the Greenspan-Summers-IMF (GSI) thesis asserted that although 
certain macroeconomic disequilibria may have provided a trigger for the crisis, 
its  fundamental  causes  lay  in  the  day-to-day  microeconomic  behaviour  of 
economic agents in these societies. In short it was argued that what was at fault 
was nothing less than the Asian way of doing business and the institutional 
structures which supported that kind of business culture. This raised specifically 
issues  of  corporate  governance,  corporate  finance,  competition  and  more 
generally  the  relationship  between  the  banks,  the  corporations  and  the 
government. How these variables and institutions interacted with each other to 
generate the crisis in terms of the GSI analysis is outlined in the next section, 
which  also  explains  the  implications  of  these  interactions  for  the  New 
International Financial Architecture (NIFA) and the WTO’s Doha Development 
Round. G7 countries have been attempting to create NIFA in the aftermath of 
the Asian crisis in order to forestall future crisis. Doha Round refers to current 




The main purpose of this paper is to critically examine important aspects of the 
above Greenspan-Summers-IMF’s structuralist thesis concerning the crisis.  It 
considers empirically what is the state of corporate governance and competition 
in the crisis-affected countries and more generally the emerging markets, and to 
what extent, if any, these accord with the requirements of the structuralist thesis.  
For this purpose the paper reports and builds on the authors’ recent empirical 
work  in  this  area
6  and  reviews  new  evidence  on  the  state  of  corporate 
governance, how corporations finance their growth, and the state of competition 
in  emerging  markets.  This  research  takes  an  international  perspective  and, 
wherever  possible,  it  provides  explicit  comparisons  between  emerging  and 
mature markets.  
 
The findings of this paper are not only of intellectual interest because of their 
direct bearing on the structuralist thesis concerning the Asian crisis but equally 
importantly  these  also  help  us  to  assess  the  desirability  of  IMF’s  reform 
program  in  these  countries.  As  IMF  (1998a)  noted  ‘The  IMF-supported 
programs and policy advice to the Asian crisis countries have placed particular 
emphasis  on  wide-ranging  structural  reforms  of  the  financial  and  corporate 
sectors, competition and governance policies and trade regimes.’  
7   3
 The  paper  contributes  firstly  by  identifying  the  important  domestic  and 
international policy  issues  which arise  from  the analysis  of corporate  sector 
behaviour  in  emerging  countries.  Secondly,  it  contributes  by  assessing  the 
validity of some of the main elements of the influential Greenspan-Summers-
IMF  thesis.  Thirdly,  it  also  contributes by  documenting  important  empirical 
anomalies which are revealed when the financing of corporate growth and the 
state  of  competition  in  emerging  and  mature  markets  are  systematically 
compared.  Specifically  the  paper  finds  that  contrary  to  what  one  may  have 
expected  a  priori  big developing country  corporations  rely  to  a surprisingly 
large extent on external rather than internal finance and within external finance 
on equity rather than debt. Similarly, the paper suggests that contrary again to a 
priori expectations competition is no less intense in emerging markets than in 
advanced countries. The paper puts forward explanations to account for these 
anomalies, but in the process new ones arise.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. After examining analytically the 
role of corporate governance, corporate finance and competition in the Asian 
crisis, in Section II, Section III reviews new information which has recently 
become available on corporate governance and comments on questions of crony 
capitalism and its relationship to economic crises.  Analysis and evidence on the 
financing of corporate growth and an examination of corporate capital structures 
in emerging and  mature economies are presented in Section IV.  Section V 
considers the state of competition in emerging markets and reports on its nature 
and intensity. The results for emerging countries are systematically compared 
with  those  obtained  by  other  investigators  for  advanced  economies,  using 
exactly the same methodology. Section VI provides a brief comparison of the 
structuralist  hypothesis  concerning  the  crisis  with  an  alternative  that  it  was 
mainly caused by precipitate financial liberalisation and Section VII concludes. 
 
II.    The  Asian  Crisis,  Corporate  Governance,  Corporate  Finance  and 
Competition: Analytical Issues 
 
The Asian crisis, which began with the floating of the Thai bhat in July 1997, 
quickly  spread  to  other  leading  Asian  developing  economies  of  Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Korea. Both the severity of the crisis (in many respects it was 
virtually a financial meltdown), as well as the fact that it engulfed some of the 
fastest growing and what were generally regarded as well managed economies 
in the world, caused consternation among policy makers in the G7 countries and 
in  the  international  financial  institutions.  However  soon  afterwards,  once  it 
became clear that the crisis was unlikely to spill over into industrial countries, 
the Greenspan-Summers-IMF thesis emerged
8.  The argument of their structural 
theory of the crisis is complex and has several strands
9.    4
First, it is suggested that poor corporate governance and lack of competition led 
to  over-investment  by  Asian  corporations.  IMF  (1998a)  noted,  in  Korea, 
government policies, such as access to easy credit through directed lending, 
played an important role in allowing the chaebols (the large conglomerates) to 
pursue growth and market share, with inadequate attention to profitability. This 
excessive  investment  resulted  in  reduced  profits  because  of  excess  capacity 
which existed in the world markets. However despite that, easy access to credit 
induced  the  chaebols  to  continue  to  invest  and  diversify  away  from  core 
businesses into other industries, often also characterized by too large capacity. 
Secondly, over-investment in turn reduced rates of return which led to falls in 
share prices and ultimately brought about a full-blown currency and banking 
crisis in part because of the weakening of the equity bases of the banks. Thus in 
this view the crisis was not caused by market failure but rather by institutional 
failure  in  Asian  economies  which  were  unable  to  curb  excessive  corporate 
investment due to deficiencies in internal governance mechanisms.  
 
The suddenness of the crisis and its severity were attributed to the cronyistic 
relationships between corporations, financial institutions and governments. The 
corporate sector was highly vulnerable because of its large debt/equity ratios, 
itself a product of crony capitalism. The financial institutions, it is suggested, 
were weakened by ‘relationship banking’ and were therefore also vulnerable. 
An external economic shock involving a rise in interest rates or a fall in the 
exchange rates would therefore greatly damage the corporate sector. Similarly, 
as the Camdessus quotation in note 4 indicates, the lack of transparency in the 
Asian style of business - because of cross holdings and hundreds of subsidiaries 
owned by the large conglomerates – made it difficult to get a true picture of the 
financial state of a corporate group as a whole. It is suggested that once the 
investors became aware of these informational flaws they reassessed the risks 




In the structural theory of the Asian Crisis the role of competition is at first sight 
somewhat  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  suggested  that  there  was  a 
competition  deficiency  within  these  countries  as  a  result  of  directed  and 
subsidised lending to favoured large firms, as well as other special concessions 
to these firms. On the other hand, it is argued that there was excess capacity in 
international markets and increased competition which led to a fall in profits. 
This ambiguity about the role of competition is however more apparent than 
real. This is because what is being suggested is that, had domestic markets been 
allowed to function normally (ie without distortions) large Korean companies 
would  not  have  been  able  to  continue  to  target  growth  and  market  share 
regardless of profitability.   5
Indeed, product  market competition by  itself  can  remedy  flaws in corporate 
governance (Glen, Lee and Singh(2000), World Bank, 2002). Such competition 
was impeded in many countries by government barriers to entry and exit, the 
latter creating a moral hazard [through ‘too big to fail’ syndrome, see however 
(Chang  2000).  The  net  result  was  over  investment  and  other  indicators  of 
inefficiency such as a decline in profits and productivity. 
 
Although the above structural theory of the Asian crisis is plausible, it is not the 
only account of the crisis, nor the one which is most persuasive. There are many 
alternate theories concerning this deep down-turn in economic activity. These 
include  theories  of  self-fulfilling  prophecies,  the  precipitate  and  unhelpful 
behaviour  of  the  banks  and  some  weaknesses  in  the  crisis  countries 
fundamentals
11. Singh and Weisse (1999) and Singh, Singh and Weisse (2003), 
suggest that the Greenspan-Summer-IMF’s structuralist thesis is deficient on 
several counts. First it is not compatible with the outstanding success of Asian 
countries  for  more  than  three  decades  before  the  crisis  if  their  institutional 
structures were as deficient as is being suggested. Secondly it does not explain 
why countries such as China and India did not have a crisis even when India’s 
fundamentals  were  worse  than  those  of  the  countries  which  had  the  crisis. 
Thirdly, the debt-equity ratios of Indian non-financial corporations were higher 
than those of corporations in Thailand or Indonesia, yet the latter had the crisis 
and India did not (Singh, 1999a). Fourthly, the critics suggest that at a macro-
economic level over-investment and mis-allocation of resources arose not so 
much from flaws in corporate governance and the state of competition but from 
financial liberalisation which a number of these countries implemented in the 
years immediately prior to the crisis. Corporate governance and intensity of 
competition were much the same in the mid-90s as they were in the previous 
three decades of outstanding success of these economies. What had changed in 
the  period  preceding  the  crisis  was  the  role  of  the  government  following 
financial  liberalisation.  The  government  in  countries  such  as  Korea  and 
Thailand, was no longer co-ordinating private sector investment activity in the 
way that it did in the era of fast growth, nor were firms guided or monitored on 
investment allocation. 
12. The crisis therefore arose not because of too much 
government intervention but too little, particularly in its crucial, former role of 
co-ordination, monitoring and guidance of private sector investment decisions. 
The IMF does not necessarily disagree with the view that a main cause of the 
crisis  was  premature  financial  liberalisation  as  it  also  emphasizes  that  the 
affected countries did not have adequate prudential supervision of the financial 
sector.  However,  as  Singh  (1998,  1999a)  has  pointed  out,  that  despite  such 
shortcomings in prudential supervision, financial liberalisation was encouraged, 
and certainly not discouraged by the IMF before the crisis. In the alternative 
analysis the main reason why despite contagion China and India were able to   6
escape the crisis was precisely because they did not have as full capital account 
liberalisation as the affected countries. Singh, Singh and Weisse (2003) argue 
that  their  alternative  analysis  is  better  able  to  explain  the  relevant  facts 
concerning  both  affected  and  non-affected  countries  than  the  Greenspan-
Summers-IMF structural theory.  
 
Despite the lack of academic consensus on the reasons for the Asian crisis and 
in particular on the structuralist thesis, the latter nevertheless determined the 
IMF’s policy response. The IMF programmes sought far-reaching institutional 
reforms in the crisis economies. These reforms at a broad level, involved the 
abandonment  of  previous  practices  and  the  establishment  of  arms-length 
relationships between government, banks and businesses, as well as big changes 
in the corporate governance mechanisms, in labour laws and competition laws 
in those economies (See footnote seven for details of the reforms in the various 
sectors in different Asian countries). The reform programme was subsequently 
universalised  and  specifically  the  reform  of  corporate  governance  became  a 
significant  part  of  the  New  International  Financial  Architecture  which,  as 
mentioned above, G7 countries have sought to establish in the world economy 
in the wake of the crisis. The responsibility for this part of the reform was 
assigned to the OECD and to the Work Bank. Both organisations have been 
collaborating  on  creating  a  ‘best-practice’  code  for  corporate  governance. 
Despite  official  denials  to  the  contrary,  a  careful  reading  of  the  text  of  the 
World Bank document [Iskander and Chamlu, 2000], suggests that the Bank’s 
preferred system of corporate governance is that that found in the US, i.e. in its 
ideal  form,  it  consists  of  corporations  with  widely  held  shares  where  the 
managers are obliged to maximise share-holder value. 
 
Several international organisations are involved in the reform of competition 
and  competition  policies  in  emerging  countries.  These  organisations  include 
OECD, UNCTAD and most notably the WTO. In order to remove internal and 
external barriers to trade advanced countries are seeking to establish a multi-
lateral  agreement  on  competition  policy  which  is  to  be  a  part  of  WTO 
disciplines.  These  proposals  are  however  opposed  by  developing  countries. 
Nevertheless,  the  international  significance  of  the  state  of  competition  and 
competition law and rules in emerging economies as well as in mature countries 
cannot be exaggerated. 
13 
 
Although the above discussion has concentrated on the international dimensions 
of corporate governance and competition issues, it is important to emphasise 
that there are also very good domestic reasons for giving priority today to these 
questions  in  many  emerging  countries.  These  arise  from  deregulation  and 
widespread  privatisation  (including  that  of  natural  monopolies)  and  the   7
increasing  role  of  the  private  sector  in  the  economies.  Studies  of  corporate 
governance and competition become salient for assessing and improving the 
efficiency of such economies, regardless of whether or not they had the crisis. 
Hence  the  analysis of corporate governance,  finance and competition  are of 
more general interest than simply as putative causal factors for the crisis in 
emerging markets. 
 
III.    Ownership,  Control  and  Corporate  Governance  in  Emerging  and 
Mature Countries 
 
The endorsement essentially of the structuralist theory of the Asian crisis by the 
International  Financial  Institutions`  (IFIs)  in  their  policy  programs  in  the 
affected countries, did lead to a large research effort by these organizations, as 
well  as  by  independent  economists,  to  gather  information  on  corporate 
governance issues in emerging countries. Although the available data is still 
patchy and far from being adequate to provide a solid basis for policy analysis, 
it is a huge improvement compared with the situation before. The main points of 
this new comparative information on ownership and control in emerging and 
mature  market  corporations  and  their  implications  for  corporate  governance 
may be summarised as follows:
14 
 
The first important point revealed by this research is that the Berle and Means 
‘widely held’ corporation, characterised by separation between ownership and 
control, is a rarity rather than the norm outside the US and the UK, even for 
large firms. As Table 1 suggests,  in the UK all the 20 largest publicly traded 
firms in 1996 were widely held (i.e., there was no family or other locus of 
control). In Mexico, on the other hand, the corresponding 20 largest firms in 
that  country,  were  all  family  controlled.  The  incidence  of  family  control  in 
many  European  countries is  also  quite  significant. More  comprehensive and 
detailed information provided by  Claessens et  al  (2000) for Asian countries 
indicates  that  for  both  large  and  small  firms  family  control  is  the  norm  in 
emerging markets. 
 
Secondly,  research  shows  (see  Table  1)  that  there  is  considerable  state 
ownership and control of large corporations in many European and as well as 
emerging markets. 
 
Thirdly,  in  large  developing  country  corporations  or  the  big  conglomerate 
groups which are ubiquitous in emerging markets (see for example Singh, 1995; 
Khanna and Yafeh 2000), there is often considerable divergence between the 
extent of corporate equity owned by families or other controlling share-holders 
and the extent of actual control over the corporations. Claessens et al (2000)   8
make a useful distinction between cashflow rights and control rights. It is often 
found that even with a small proportion of equity, families are able to lever 
themselves to control a majority of the shares. This is done by a variety of 
devices,  such  as  pyramiding,  introduction  of  different  classes  of  shares, 
complex cross-holdings of shares between parent and subsidiaries companies. 
 
Thus, Table 2 indicates that among the top 44 Indian listed companies in 1999, 
the  founding  families  together  with  the  directors  owned  on  average  23.5 
(22.4+1.1) percent of the shares. The government through nationalised banks 
and other financial institutions owned a greater proportion (27.5 percent). Taken 
together, the state share holdings were so large in most big Indian corporations 
that  the  government  could  in  principle  greatly  influence,  if  not  determine, 
management  changes  in  these  companies.  However,  in  practice,  the  Indian 
government  allows  founding  families  and  their  heirs  to  run  and  control  the 
corporations.  The  government  is  content  to  support  the  existing  family 
managements  with  its  share  holdings  unless  the  firm  performance  is 
exceptionally poor.  
 
Similarly, on Korea, Joh (2003) reports that in the mid 1990s in the 70 largest 
chaebol  controlling  shareholders  owned  on  average  about  17percent  of  the 
shares. The ownership of controlling shareholders was negatively related to the 
size of the corporations so that the weighted average ownership concentration in 
these same group of 70 larger chaebols was only 9.9percent.  However, though 
a variety of devices of the kind mentioned above, their control rights amounted 
to nearly 25percent of the shares. The controlling shareholders were able to 
maintain control with the help of financial institutions, many of which were 
directly under government control or greatly influenced by it.  These institutions 
normally supported the controlling shareholders – usually the founding families 
and their heirs, or certainly did not intervene continuously to ensure that there 
was good corporate governance. 
 
III.I  Concentration of Family Control, Crony Capitalism and Economic 
Crises 
 
In order to examine the phenomenom of crony capitalism and its relationship to 
the economic crisis Claessen et al (2000) provide data (see Table 3) on the 
concentration of the total value of corporate listed assets controlled by the top 
families  in  9  Asian  countries.  In  addition  to  ‘normalisation’  by  total  stock 
market capitalisation, the variable, the total value of listed assets controlled by 
families, is also normalised by GDP of the country concerned (the last two 
columns of Table 3). If  concentration is measured in terms of total value of 
listed  corporate  assets  the  four  crisis  affected  Asian  countries,  (Indonesia,   9
Malaysia, Korea and Thailand), had greater concentration than the non-crisis 
countries (Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan). However, 
there  is  no  relationship  between  concentration  and  crisis  if  the  normalising 
variable is GDP rather than total listed corporation assets. It is arguable that 
GDP,  being  more  comprehensive,  would  provide  a  more  appropriate 
normalisation  variable  than  total  listed  assets.  Inter-country  differences  in 
concentration measured in terms of total stock market value may reflect more 
the extent of stock market development in various countries than the relative 
influence of top families on government policy. Ideally, what one would like is 
data on total wealth ownership including land holdings. For many developing 
countries the main locus of political power lies in land holdings and GDP is 
likely  to  be  a  better  proxy  for  a  country’s  total  wealth  than  stock  market 
valuation. There is thus, even in its own terms, no robust association between 
crony capitalism and financial crisis let alone a causal link between the two 
variables. Such a casual link is in any case highly problematic as the theoretical 
objections to it and the illustrative example of Sweden, both outlined below, 
indicate. 
 
In democratic Sweden, where protestant ethic rules out any hint of cronyism or 
other  kind  of  corruption,  a  single  family,  the  Wallenbergs,  are  believed  to 
control 60 percent of the country’s industrial assets. This has not resulted in 
reduced efficiency or less democratic accountability of the industrial system. 
The analytical reasons for this phenomenon have been examined by Berglof and 
von  Thadden  (1999)  and  Singh,  Singh  and  Weisse  (2003).  The  essential 
argument of these authors can be summarised as follows.  Crony capitalism is 
not  a  corporate  governance  problem  as  such,  it  is  rather  a  product  of  the 
complex  of  relations  between  the  business  and  political  elites  and  could  in 
principle arise in systems with widely dispersed ownership. 
 
 Further,  as  also  noted  earlier,  the  system  of  corporate  governance  in  many 
Asian  countries  was  not  at  all  that  different  from  that  observed  in  several 
European countries, with family-owned and controlled firms being the norm in 
both sets of countries. This system worked extremely successfully in the Asian 
economies for the past 30  years leading to high long-term growth rates and 
reduction  of  poverty.    In  continental  European  countries  such  a  family 
dominated system has worked well over a much longer period and has not led to 
Asian type crises.    10
III.2  Family Ownership and Corporate Performance 
 
Apart from the issue of concentration of family ownership and economic crisis 
it is also relevant to ask how does family ownership affect corporate governance 
and performance at a microeconomic level. There are only a small number of 
empirical studies  on  this  subject  for  emerging  countries  and  they  provide  a 
mixed picture.  Suehiro’s (2001) comprehensive study of ownership, control 
and performance in Thailand in the period 1996 – 2000 came to the conclusion  
“…it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  difference  in  ownership  pattern  as  well  as  the 
presence of a family-run business have hardly affected corporate performance in 
terms  of  financial  indicators,  such  as  the  D/E  ratio,  ROA  and  ROE.    It  is 
difficult  to  see  any  distinct  interrelationship  between  family  ownership  of 
business and poor performance in terms of leverage and profitability.  Further, 
contrary to the traditional argument in favour of the model of good corporate 
governance,  the  group  of  corporations  with  no  ultimate  owners  (WV)  has 
always shown the worst business record among surveyed listed companies in 
Thailand.” [(Suehiro, p.12) emphasis in the original].  
 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) studied a sample of large Indian firms in 1993 and 
concluded that firms affiliated with big diversified business groups performed 
better than independent firms. Lemmon and Lins’ (2002) study of Korean firms 
suggested  that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  relationship  between 
ownership and Tobin’s Q. However, Joh (2003) examined a very large sample 
of  Korean  firms  in  the  period  immediately  preceding  the  crisis,  1993-97. 
Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, Joh  found a cubic relationship 
between ownership and firm profitability; profitability generally increases as 
ownership of the controlling families increases. Profitability is reduced when 
ownership is extremely high or extremely low. Joh attributes this result to poor 
corporate governance and suggests that the reasons why these findings differ 
from those of Lemmon and Lins and of Khanna and Palepu is because he is 
considering the period of the mid-1990s, which is later than that of Lemmon 
and Lins’ study when the Korean economy was less developed. His essential 
argument is that the business group structure found in Asian countries is helpful 
at lower level of economic development as it allows an internal capital market 
to allocate resources more efficiently than an under-developed external capital 
market.  However,  at  a  higher  level  of  development,  the  advantages  of  an 
internal capital market are out-weighed by those of an external market. 
 
Joh also suggests that Korean firms suffered from chronic low profitability in 
years before the crisis and that firm profitability was deteriorating in the pre-
crisis period.
15 This proposition is examined more generally for crisis-stricken 
as well as non-crisis Asian countries in Tables 10 and 11. The Tables provide   11
information on rates of return for the same group of Asian countries for which 
the question of crony capitalism was considered in table 3.
16 Table 10 indicates 
that the inflation adjusted rates of return were low or negative in the period 
preceding the crisis (1994-96) in Korea and Indonesia, but so was the case in 
non-crisis countries such as India and Hong Kong. The last two rows of the 
table  suggest  that  the  period  preceding  the  crisis  there  was  a  very  little 
difference between the group medians of crisis and non-crisis countries. Further, 
Table 11 indicates that during 1994-96 the inflation adjusted returns on equity 
were robust and highly positive in both crisis and non-crisis economies and 
again there was relatively little difference between the group medians. 
 
 
IV.  Financing of Corporate Growth and Corporate Governance 
 
We turn now to an analysis of the relationship between corporate finance and 
corporate governance. A priori one would expect the two variables to be closely 
related  with  causation  running  both  ways.  A  central  issue  here  is  how  do 
providers of finance to the corporation ensure that their money will be returned 
and  not  simply  appropriated  by  the  managers  or  whoever  is  controlling  the 
enterprise  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1997).  This  question  will  be  discussed 
analytically and empirically below in two stages. Firstly, we will enquire, how 
do emerging firms finance their growth, i.e., to what extent firms use retained 
profits or long-term debt or new equity to pay for the expansion of their net 
assets? At the second stage the implications of the observed financing patterns 
for corporate governance will be examined. 
 
 IMF (1998a) and the World Bank (1998) suggest that a main reason for the 
shortcomings in corporate governance in emerging markets was their low level 
of development of the stock market. Corporations were therefore obliged to go 
to  the  banks  for  financing  their  investment  needs.  With  the  government 
favouring such finance for large firms it led to high-debt equity ratios; however 
the banks because of this cronyistic or close relationships with the government 
and with the corporations, did not perform the monitoring and disciplinary role 
which the stock market could perform. Hence in the financial sector reform 
program for the Asian countries, the IMF and World Bank, proposed that the 
Asian government should adopt the following policies (Suhero, 2001): 
 
·  Develop their stock markets in order to promote direct corporate 
finance; 
·  Appoint  independent directors  to  company Boards  and  establish 
independent audit committees;   12
·  Introduce  new  audit  and  accounting  systems  in  line  with  the 
International  Accounting  Standards  Committee  (IASC)  or  the 
American Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB); 
·  Introduce new legal frameworks governing bankruptcy in order to 
quickly resolve corporate debt conflicts between foreign creditors 
and local debtors and 
·  Promote  an  information  disclosure  system  to  improve  local 
corporations’ transparency for the sake of investors and minority 
shareholders. 
 
However empirical evidence on the role of the stock market and the financing 
of corporation growth do not accord with the international financial institutions 
presuppositions  as  is  indicated  below.  Singh  and  Hamid  (1992)  and  Singh 
(1995), were among the first large scale studies of financing corporate growth in 
emerging  markets.  These  studies  (referred  hereafter  as  S  and  H)  arrived  at 
theoretically quite unexpected conclusions. S and H found from their analysis of 
normally the 100 largest quoted firms in manufacturing in 10 leading emerging 
markets, that these corporations rely overwhelmingly on external finance rather 
than internal finance (retained profits) to pay for the growth of their net assets  
(see Table 4).  The average quoted firm in Singh’s 1995 study financed only 40 
percent of its growth from internal sources and 60 percent from outside finance, 
with  long-term  debt  constituting  40  percent  and  new  equity  comprising  20 
percent of the total growth of net assets. As these are the average figures, the 
use of external finance was even higher in some of the individual countries such 
as Korea. In that country external finance comprised almost 85 percent of the 
total growth of corporate net assets.
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The reasons why these figures are so surprising is conveyed in part by data in 
Table  5  for  advanced  countries  (ACs).    This  Table  suggests  that  AC 
corporations unlike those from developing countries (DCs) in Table 4 seem to 
rely overwhelmingly on internal finance i.e., retained profits for their financing 
needs. The contribution of equity finance from the stock market is very small in 
all countries and indeed negative in the case of U.S. and U.K.  Negative figures 
for equity indicate that the total value of new issues of stock are less than the 
equity redeemed either by firms purchasing their own stock or shares which are 
bought up during takeovers. 
 
It is not surprising in itself that there should be differences between AC and DC 
corporations in relation to how they would meet their financing requirements. 
However, what is observed is totally opposite to what economic analysis would 
predict to be the nature of the differences between the two groups. In view of   13
the fact that DC capital markets are regarded as being under-developed and 
imperfect one would have expected DC companies would be obliged to rely 
mostly  on  internal  sources  rather  than  on  an  imperfect  and  therefore  more 
expensive  market  for  outside  finance.  Similarly,  AC  corporations  may  be 
expected to use more finance from the stock market and the banks compared 
with those from DCs, as the former have more highly developed and efficient 
capital markets. 
 
Another important reason for expecting the opposite result to what is observed 
lies in the volatility of share prices in DC stock markets. As stock markets in 
emerging  countries  are  relatively  new  and  firms  do  not  have  established 
reputations  one  would  expect  arbitrary  and  fluctuating  prices  -  a  prediction 
which  is  confirmed  by  the  data  (Tirole  (1991),  Singh  (1999a).    In  these 
circumstances risk averse firms may not wish to raise funds on the stock market, 
may indeed shun the stock market altogether and not seek a listing at all. This 
point leads to another anomalous fact: an emerging stock market such as that of 
India has 8000 companies listed on it, more than the number listed on the New 
York stock market. 
 
The  pattern  of  finance  reported  in  Table  5  for  AC  corporations  is  fully 
compatible with the so called ‘pecking order’ theory of finance. This theory is 
based on the concept of asymmetric information. In a classic paper, Majluf and 
Meyers (1984) showed that in the presence of asymmetric information about the 
firms’ prospects between the managers and the investing public, it would pay 
rational managers to follow a hierarchy of finance with retained profits first, 
debt next if a firm’s investment requirements are more than the funds provided 
by retained earnings, and only as a last resort should the firm go to the stock 
market.
18 However, Guggler, Mueller and Yortoglu (2003) and Singh (2003a) 
have noted that in view of the regulatory deficits of emerging stock markets 
these  countries  may  be  even  more  subject  to  asymmetric  information  than 
advanced  countries.  Further,  Singh’s  (2003a)  theoretical  analysis  of  the 
financing of corporate growth in developing countries suggests that there are 
emerging  market  specificities,  which  would  provide  further  incentive  to 
developing  country  firms  to  use  mostly  internal  finance  rather  than  debt  or 
equity. These special features of DC firms are firstly that they are family owned 
and therefore are much less subject to agency problems as compared to AC 
firms. Secondly, DC firms would like to retain family control and therefore 
wish  to  avoid  the  stock  market  to  raise  funds,  as  that  would  dilute  their 
ownership  and  control.  Taking  all  these  considerations  into  account,  Singh 
(2003a) sums up the theoretical position on the financing of corporate growth in 
the following terms: that if there are good reasons to expect the pecking order   14
pattern of finance for AC firms, there are even better reasons for doing so for 
DC firms. 
 
How does one explain these theoretically anomalous results in Tables 4 and 5? 
The first point here is that the two tables are using different sources of data and 
answering different questions. Table 5 is based on flow-of-funds data and is 
concerned with the question how does non-financial corporate sector as a whole 
finance  its  growth.  Table  4,  based  on  accounting  data,  is  concerned  with  a 
different question how does an individual firm finance its growth of net assets. 
From the perspective of the theory of the firm the second question is  more 
appropriate  since the  theory  relating  for example  to  asymmetric information 
outlined above, is concerned with the individual firm’s behaviour rather than 
that of the corporate sector as a whole. 
 
Other methodological differences underlying Tables 4 and 5 are empirical rather 
than theoretical. In Table 4, data for corporate growth nets out depreciation 
from both the beginning and the end of the period assets figures, whereas in 
Table 5 depreciation is not netted out. However, when the same methodology is 
used to measure the contribution of different sources of finance to corporate 
growth in emerging and mature markets, the results for the two groups are much 
closer but nevertheless, there still remain theoretically anomalous differences.  
 
Singh’s 1995 study was based on the data for the 1980s. For the 1990s there is 
now more comprehensive data available which raises two issues. First, do these 
anomalous results for the 1980s continue into the 1990s, and secondly, whether 
the more comprehensive data available now leads to any revisions of the results 
produced by S and H with more limited data for the 1980s. Taking the second 
question first, this has been investigated in Singh (2003a) and in Whittington et 
al., (1997). The results indicate that in the absence of directly available data on 
equity financing in the 1980s exercise, estimation of the contribution of that 
variable by indirect methods is unlikely to have led to a persistent upward bias 
in the figures reported for this variable for most countries. 
 
We turn now to the first question of how do the results of the 1990s differ from 
those of 1980s. Table 6 provides information on this subject for firms in 22 
developing  and  22  advanced  countries  –  a  much  bigger  and  more 
comprehensive dataset than that which was available to S and H in the 1980s. 
This new dataset is described in Glen and Singh (2003). Table 6 indicates that 
between 1995 and 2000 on average the DC firms financed 27 percent of their 
growth of total assets from retained profits, 35 percent from increased debt (i.e., 
liabilities)  and  the  remaining  39  percent  by  external  equity  issues.  In  AC 
corporations it would appear that, much the large part of growth of corporate   15
total assets has been financed by long-term debt (53 percent); the contribution 
of external equity at 17 percent is much smaller than for DC firms while the 
contribution  of  internal  finance  at  30  percent  is  marginally  higher  than  the 
average for emerging markets. These data indicate that the pecking order theory 
is  comprehensively  rejected  for  many  developing  as  well  as  developed 
countries.  Further,  the  anomalous  pattern  of  financing  behaviour  for  DC 
corporations in 1980s continues to prevail in the 1990s although in a somewhat 
weaker form than before.
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We  turn  now  to  the  implications  of  these  observed  patterns  of  financing 
corporate growth for corporate governance. The empirical results show prima 
facie  that new  issues  on  the  stock  market  are  relatively  more  important  for 
corporations in emerging countries than for those in advanced countries. There 
are  in principle three channels  through which  corporate  governance  may  be 
affected by the stock market: a) the regulatory framework of the stock market 
itself  concerning  standards  for  corporate  accounts,  transparency,  etc.,  b)  the 
pricing process on the stock market and c) the takeover process. However, all 
three channels are not equally powerful and corporate governance is affected 
more by the stock market in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. than in 
other countries, including DCs.  The main reason for this is not that firms in the 
U.S and the U.K. have greater recourse to stock market finance or go more 
often to the stock market to raise finance than elsewhere. If anything, there is 
evidence that many large Anglo-Saxon firms seldom go to the stock market to 
raise any capital at all. Nevertheless, because of the existence of a highly active 
market for corporate control in the U.S. and the U.K. even firms which shun the 
stock market become subject to takeover discipline.  
 
Such markets for corporate control have not yet evolved in emerging countries.  
These exist, if at all, in an embryonic form in a few developing economies. 
Significantly  markets  for  corporate  control  do  not  exist  even  in  most  ACs, 
including notably West Germany and Japan. This is not an evolutionary deficit 
in these countries but rather a matter of deliberate design (Singh, 2001; Odagiri, 
1992). Significantly, the lack of a market for corporate control has not imposed 
any great hardship on these economies as their superior long-term economic 
record say over the last 50 or a 100 years compared with that of Anglo-Saxon 
countries indicates. Although the main influence of the stock market on large 
corporations is through the takeover mechanism, they are also affected by the 
stock market pricing process (which affects their cost of capital) and the stock 
market’s regulatory framework (which affects their information disclosure and 
treatment  of  minority  shareholders).  However,  if  there  is  no  takeover 
mechanism and firms do not go to the stock market because there are alternative 
channels available for financing corporate growth from sources other than the   16
stock market (say, for example, the banks), the stock market would have very 
little influence on corporations.  
An important question in the present context is whether a greater influence of 
the stock market would lead to an improvement in corporate governance and in 
corporate performance. This essentially boils down to the question whether DCs 
should encourage and promote a quicker development of a market for corporate 
control. This is a highly controversial issue. Singh (1997, 1999b, 2003a) has 
argued in previous contributions that the stock market pricing process and the 
takeover  mechanism  are  not  in general  very  helpful  in  improving  economic 
performance in advanced countries and there are good reasons to suggest that 
they are even less likely to do so in developing countries.  
 
A complex analytical and empirical argument on these issues may briefly be 
stated in the following terms: in relation to the pricing process in the real world 
stock  markets,  Tobin’s  (1984)  distinction  between  ‘information  arbitrage’ 
efficiency  and  ‘fundamental  valuation’  efficiency  is  important.  Evidence 
suggests,  while  markets  may  be  efficient  in  the  former  sense  (even  that  is 
debatable),  they  are  not  efficient  in  the  more  crucial  sense  of  not  always 
reflecting a corporation’s “fundamentals” (Shiller, 2000; JEP, 1990). This point 
does  not  need  to  be  belaboured  today  in  the  light  of  the  bursting  of  the 
technology bubble in the western stock markets and ten years of stock market 
decline in Japan. Equally, it will be difficult to preach a gospel of the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH) to citizens in Thailand or Indonesia who suffered a 
virtual meltdown of their stock markets during the crisis. 
 
Further, with respect to the takeover mechanism, three decades of analysis and 
empirical research suggests that selection in the market for corporate control 
does not take place on the basis of performance alone but on the basis of both 
size  and  performance.
20  Thus  a  large  relatively  unprofitable  company  has  a 
better chance of surviving takeovers than a small relatively profitable company.  
However,  not  only  size  provides  relative  immunity  from  takeover;  a  large 
company may become bigger still through the takeover process itself. Further, 
there are good theoretical reasons as well as empirical evidence that takeovers 
may  lead  to  “short-termism”  and  more  broadly  to  economic  rewards  being 
given  for  financial  engineering  rather  than  for  entrepreneurial  efforts  in 
improving products and cutting costs. The takeover disciplining process is thus 
observed to be arbitrary and a haphazard one (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). 
The deficiencies of the pricing and the takeover processes are compounded in 
the case of developing countries because of the regulatory deficits and relative 
immaturity of their markets. Singh (1998) therefore suggested restrictions on 
the evolution of a market for corporate control in emerging countries.
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The above analysis indicates that at the very least it is arguable that the World 
Bank and IMF preference for the US model of corporate governance based on 
widely held firms and a stock market takeover mechanism may have serious 
drawbacks for developing countries. The international community would be ill-
advised to establish such an international best-practice standard for DC firms to 
follow without a great deal of further analysis and supporting evidence. 
 
V.  The State of Competition in Emerging Markets
22 
 
We turn now to the second part of the Greenspan-Summers-IMF structuralist 
thesis which, as indicated earlier, asserts that the Asian crisis in a fundamental 
sense  was  caused  by  the  Asian  way  of  doing  business.    Apart  from  weak 
corporate governance the latter, in this view, also included poor competition 
environment.  The question of intensity of competition in emerging markets will 
be considered here empirically in a comparative international perspective. 
 
There is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the state of competition in 
emerging  markets  despite  the  fact  that  many  of  these  economies  have  been 
following  market-oriented  policies  of  deregulation  and  privatisation  now  for 
nearly  20  years.    In  the  absence  of  hard  evidence  there  are  different  views 
among  economists  as  to  how  intense  competition  is  in  emerging  markets.  
Laffont (1999) holds for instance that as many developing countries are small 
with  segmented  markets,  high  transportation  costs  and  infrastructure 
bottlenecks, they are unlikely to have strong competition.  Similarly, de Soto’s 
(2001)  work  would  seem  to  suggest  that  there  are  government  imposed 
bureaucratic  hurdles  for  starting  new  businesses  which  restrict  entry  and 
therefore  are  not  compatible  with  a  vibrant  competitive  economy.    Porter 
(1990), on the other hand, on the basis of case studies, suggests that in Korea 
corporations  are  subject  to  intense  competition,  both  domestically  and 
externally, and indeed only those industries in Korea are successful in which 
firms are fixed with stiff competition. Amsden and Singh (1994) also suggest 
that the Korean chaebol are highly rivalrous. 
 
The  small  amount  of  data  available  on  an  international  comparative  basis 
suggests that many leading developing countries have high three or four-firm 
concentration ratios compared with advanced countries (World Bank, 1993).  
On the other hand, it is also the case that developing countries tend to have a 
very large proportion of small firms employing less than ten workers.  These 
constitute normally more than 50 per cent of total industrial labour force in 
leading  emerging  countries  compared  with less  than ten percent  in the  U.S. 
economy.    Thus  these  static  measures  of  competition  provide  conflicting 
evidence about the state of competition in emerging markets.   18
In  order  to  overcome  the  well  known  difficulties  with  static  measures  of 
concentration, Glen, Lee and Singh (2001, 2002) have used time-series analysis 
of corporate profitability in seven emerging markets to discover the dynamic 
and the intensity of competition in these economies relative to what has been 
observed for advanced countries.  Glen, Lee and Singh have employed the same 
methodology  of  the  persistence  of  profitability  (PP)  studies  (pioneered  by 
Dennis  Mueller  and  his  colleagues)  which  has  been  widely  used  to  study 
competition intensity in developed countries.  It will be recalled that the PP 
methodology involves fitting the following autoregressive equation applied to 
the time series of profitability of individual firms 
 
πi,t = αi + λiπi, t-1 +  i,t           (1) 
 
πi,t  is the profitability of firm i at time t, i = 1,….,m, t = 1,…..,T.   i,t is the usual 
error term and αi and λi are the model parameters.  λi indicates the speed of 
adjustment; if λi < 1, the long-run (permanent) profitability level of firm i is 
given by: 
 
πi,p = αi / 1-λi               (2) 
 
As  is  usual  in  PP  studies,  to  control  for  business  cycles  and  other 
macroeconomic shocks, the regression analysis is conducted in terms of the 
variable Yi,t = πi,t - πt , where πt is the average of the πi,t across firms.  The 
measure Yit represents the deviation of firm i's profitability at time t from the 
profitability of all other firms in the country at that time.  The analysis is based on 
models of the form:  
 
Yit = ai + l1i Yi(t-1) + l2i Yi(t-2) + eit        (3) 
 
where ai, l1i and l2i are coefficients and the eit are random errors. The empirical 
analysis shows that this model is sufficient to capture the dynamics in all cases in 
the seven emerging countries studied by Glen, Lee and Singh.  
 
From (3), the statistic YiLR = αi / (1-λ1i - λ2i) can be derived to indicate firm i's long-
term profitability relative to the country average.  If l2i=0, then the estimate of l1i 
provides a direct measure of the speed of adjustment of profitability following a 
shock. Assuming λ1iÎ(0,1), adjustment to equilibrium is monotonic.  Where l2i is 
not zero or λ1iÎ (-1, 0), adjustment is non-monotonic and there is no unique way 
of  characterising  its  speed  based  on  the  estimated  parameters.  [See  further 
Goddard and Wilson (1999)]. 
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The estimated values of λi and the proportion of firms for which YiLR are either 
significantly positive or significantly negative at the 5% level are reported in 
Table  7.    The  exactly  corresponding  values  of  these  variables  for  advanced 
countries, estimated by other researchers, are reported in Tables 8 and 9.  
 
Surprisingly,  as  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  the  results  indicate  that 
developing countries have, on the whole, lower persistency coefficients (λi) than 
those observed for advanced countries, even when allowance is made for the 
shorter time series of corporate profitability available for developing than for 
advanced countries (see Tables 7 and 8).  Further, the proportion of firms for 
which long-term profitability is significantly different from the norm, either in 
the positive or negative directions, is also much lower for developing than for 
advanced  countries,  as  a  comparison  of  Tables  7  and  9  indicates.    The 
conventional  interpretation  of  these  results  would  suggest  that  developing 
countries  are  subject  to  no  less,  if  not  greater,  competition  than  advanced 
countries.  The possible sources of statistical bias in these empirical results for 
emerging  economies  have  been  examined  in  detail  by  Glen,  Lee  and  Singh 
(2002) and they find that these do not affect their main conclusions. 
 
Complementary evidence to that of Glen, Lee and Singh is provided by other 
research which also bears on the dynamics of the competition process but uses a 
different methodology. This work, which systematically analyses turnover and 
the mobility of firms, provides interesting results.  Studies in this genre have 
recently been summarized by Tybout (2000) and Caves (1998).  The results 
indicate that there is greater mobility as well as entry and exit of firms in the 
small number of emerging markets for which such studies have been carried out 
than for advanced countries. 
 
Apart  from  these  two  kinds  of  studies  on  the  dynamics  of  the  competition 
process, there are also other types of evidence pertaining to the efficiency of 
emerging market industries and to scale economies which do not accord with 
the  conventional  anecdotal  account  of  the  lack  of  competition  in  emerging 
countries.  This empirical research has recently been reviewed by Tybout (2000) 
who sums up the situation as follows: 
 
Indeed, although the issue remains open, the existing empirical literature does 
not  support  the  notion  that  LDC  manufacturers  are  relatively  stagnant  and 
inefficient. Turnover rates in plants and jobs are at least as high as those found 
in the OECD, and the amount of cross-plant dispersion in measured productivity 
rates is not generally greater. Also, although small-scale production is relatively 
common in LDCs, there do not appear to be major potential gains from better 
exploitation of scale economies. (p.38)    20
 
Singh  (2002a)  suggests  that  these  results  on  the  comparative  intensity  of 
competition in emerging and mature countries are in economic terms totally 
plausible.    This  is  because  although  there  are  many  structural  features  of 
developing  countries  and  the  policies  of  their  governments,  which  are  anti-
competition,  there  are  also  equally  strong,  if  not  stronger,  structural  factors 
which  favour  competition.    The  anti-competition  factors  would  include 
transportation  and  infrastructural  deficiencies  as  well  as  the  maize  of 
bureaucratic  procedures  often  required  to  start  a  business  in  developing 
countries.    However,  these  may  be  more  than  balanced  by  pro-competition 
forces  which include  lower sunk  costs  for  starting a  business  in developing 
countries, a large demand for simple products, and at times a pro-competition 
government policy stance (for example, some developing countries have made 
firms  compete  for  government  favours  by  setting  specified  performance 




VI.  The Structural Thesis, Financial Liberalisation and Economic Crises 
 
The  previous  sections  have  examined  in  detail  important  aspects  of  the 
Greenspan-Summer-IMF structuralist thesis. The empirical findings on the role 
of  corporate  governance,  the  nature  of  corporate  finance  and  the  state  of 
competition in emerging markets may be summarised as follows:  
 
(1)  There is no robust evidence to suggest even an association between crony 
capitalism (proxied by concentration of control over corporate assets by a few 
top families, measured in different ways) and economic crisis, let alone a causal 
relationship between the two variables.
24 
 
(2)  Available  evidence does  not support the  view that  there is a  negative 
relationship  between  family  ownership and  control of  Asian firms  and  their 
economic performance.  Further, falling profitability in the years prior to the 
crisis in countries such as Korea was not due to family control of corporations 
but  other  factors.    Moreover  there  is  little  evidence  to  suggest  that  falling 
profitability ‘caused’ the crisis since such deterioration in profits was observed 
in both crisis and non-crisis countries. 
 
(3)  Contrary to much economic analysis and World Bank-IMF conjectures, 
stock markets in emerging countries provided a surprisingly large proportion of 
resources for the growth of corporate net assets during the 1980s, and this trend, 
broadly speaking, continued into the 1990s, until the Asian crisis. However it 
was noted that the main influence of the stock market on corporate governance   21
comes  through  the  market  for  corporate  control.  Such  a  market  has  not  yet 
evolved in most emerging countries, although it exists in an embryonic form in 
a  few  of  them.  Economic  analysis  as  well  as  the  experience  of  advanced 
countries  suggests  that  the  fuller  development  of  such  a  market  will  not 
necessarily be helpful to most developing countries.
25 
  
(4)  Contrary  to  the  structuralist  thesis,  corporations  in  leading  emerging 
markets  are  subject  to  intense  competition  and  display  highly  rivalorous 
behaviour.    Empirical  studies,  using  different  methodologies  indicate  that 
competition in emerging countries is at least as intense as in mature countries. 
 
Thus  micro-economic  behaviour  and  structures  in  emerging  markets  do  not 
provide robust evidence in favour of the structuralist thesis. In sharp contrast, it 
is important to note that there is strong and robust support for the alternative 
analysis,  which  attributes  the  Asian  crisis  mainly  to  precipitate  financial 
liberalisation. Apart from the analysis and broad brush evidence in favour of 
this hypothesis outlined earlier, systematic studies including those by Kaminski 
and Reinhart (1999) and by Dominique and Detragiache (1998) indicate that 
there is a close relationship between financial liberalization and economic crisis 
in developing countries, which may take the form of a banking crisis, currency 
crises or both. The evidence on this subject has been reviewed recently in Singh 
(2003b). The empirical findings of this literature contradict neoclassical theory 
which  suggests  that  financial  liberalisation  and  new  financial  instruments 
should lead to consumption smoothing rather than to crises. The reasons for this 
disjuncture between the traditional theory and evidence have also been explored 
in this large literature which attributes it to the following main factors: 
 
·  Inherent  volatility  in  capital  flows  due  to  irrational  exuberance  or 
unwarranted pessimism of investors
26 
 
·  Increased competition among banks following liberalization
27 
 




·  In  theoretical  terms,  liberalization  of  trade  in  goods  (i.e.  free  trade), 
which is presumed to lead to Pareto-optimal allocation of resources under 
well-known  conditions,  is  quite  different  from  financial  liberalization. 
This  is  because  such  liberalization  is  dominated  by  informational 
asymmetries,  problems  of  morals  hazard  and  adverse  selection  among 
other difficulties.
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After having promoted capital account liberalisation in emerging markets for 
many years (see for example Fischer 1997), IMF (2003) indicates a definite 
change in direction
30. The IMF paper sums up the empirical evidence on this 
issue in the following terms,  
 
‘There  is  little  evidence  that  financial  integration  has  helped  developing 
countries  to  better  stabilize  fluctuations  in  consumption  growth, 
notwithstanding the theoretically large benefits that could accrue to developing 
countries in this respect. In fact, new evidence presented in this paper suggests 
that  low  to  moderate  levels  of  financial  integration  may  have  made  some 
countries subject to even greater volatility of consumption relative to that of 
output. Thus, while there is no proof in the data that financial globalisation has 
benefited growth; there is evidence that some countries may have experienced 
greater consumption volatility as a result. 
 
Singh, Singh and Weisse (2003) suggest that a viable explanation of the Asian 
crisis that encompasses all the observed facts for both the crisis and non-crisis 
economies is that the afflicted “economies dismantled their controls over the 
borrowing  of  the  private  sector  and  embraced  financial  liberalization.  As  a 
consequence, the private sector built up short-term foreign currency debt that 
often found its way into the non-tradable sector and into speculative real estate 
ventures. Accompanying financial liberalization was the irrational exuberance 
and contagion that are always latent in private international financial flows.” 
Thus it can be argued that the crisis occurred not because the Asian model was 
followed but precisely because it was not followed. Singh, Singh and Weisse 
(2003) go on to add that “while Edmund Phelps identifies the crisis with the 
failure of Asian corporatism (Phelps, 1999), in reality this system underpinned 
the most successful industrialization drive in history and dramatically reduced 




VII.  Conclusion 
 
It has been argued in this paper that instead of the corporate governance system 
and  the  state  of  competition  in  emerging  markets  being  flawed,  it  was  the 
Greenspan- Summers-IMF thesis which attributed the fundamental causes of the 
Asian  crisis  to  these  factors  that  was  deeply  flawed.  The  IMF’s  structural 
reform programme, based on this flawed thesis, is consequently not very helpful 
for developing countries.  The analyses and evidence presented and reviewed in 
this  paper  suggest  that  the  replacement  of  the  existing  system  of  family 
ownership  and  control  in  these  countries  by  the  Anglo-Saxon  system  of   23
corporate  governance  (based  on  well-developed  stock  markets,  widely  held 
firms and shareholder wealth maximization by managers) is unlikely either to 
benefit economic development or to make the liberalized global economy more 
stable.  
 
Space  does  not  permit  a  full  discussion  of  the  policy  implications  of  the 
alternative  thesis,  which  attributes  the  Asian  economic  crisis  primarily  to 
precipitate financial liberalization. Suffice it is to say that the reform program 
based on this alternative theory of the crisis does not necessarily involve full re-
imposition of the former planning regimes. In the situation following the crisis, 
it  rather  calls  for  deepening  of  the  co-operation  between  government  and 
business by including labour in the process. During the course of economic 
development,  purposeful  co-operation  between  these  entities  is  much  to  be 
preferred  to  conflictual  and  adversarial  relations  between  them.  To  take  a 
specific example, in the case of the Korean chaebol, one way of implementing 
this alternative reform programme would be to establish a German type two-
tiered  board  system  for  these  large  corporations,  where  the  employers  and 
employees are represented on the higher level supervisory board (which takes 
strategic  decisions), while  day  to  day  governance would  rest with corporate 
management. There may need to be some variation on this model in the Korean 
situation which may well also require representation of the civil society and the 
government on the supervisory boards. Such reforms of corporate governance in 
leading  emerging  markets  are  arguably  more  likely  to  foster  economic 
development  than  the  proposals  put  forward  by  international  financial 




In view of the domestic as well as international policy significance of corporate 
governance  and  competition  outlined  earlier  (in  relation  to  the  New 
International  Financial  Architecture  and  the  current  Doha  Developmental 
Round at the WTO), it is important that policy analysis in this area should be 
based  on  solid,  unbiased  empirical  research.  This  paper  has  hopefully 
contributed to this endeavour in some small way. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Control of publicly traded firms around the world, 1996 (per cent) of the 
20 largest firms under each category
32  
           












           
OECD countries            
(non-Bank borrower)           
           
Australia  65  5  5    25 
Austria  5  15  70     
Belgium  5  50  5  30   
Canada  60  25      15 
Denmark  40  35  15     
Finland  35  10  35  5  5 
France  60  20  15  5   
Germany  50  10  25  15   
Greece  10  50  30  10   
Ireland  65  10      10 
Italy  20  15  40  5  10 
Japan  90  5  5     
Netherlands  30  20  5    10 
New Zealand  30  25  25    20 
Norway  25  25  35  5   
Portugal  10  45  25  15  0 
Spain  35  15  30  10  10 
Sweden  25  45  10  15   
Switzerland  60  3    5   
UK  100         
USA  80  20       
           
Bank borrowers and others         
           
Argentina    65  15  5  15 
Hong Kong  10  70  5  5   
Israel  5  50  40    5 
Mexico    100       
Singapore  15  30  45  5  5 
Korea, Rep. of  55  20  15    5 
           
           


























Table 2: Ownership structure of Indian companies. Top 44 listed companies in manufacturing 
(percentage of equity owned by various companies)
Quartile Foreign  Government Corporate Directors Public Total
Quartile 1 16.1 28.9 23.1 1.1 30.8 100
Quartile 2 24.3 25.6 25.6 1.2 23.3 100
Quartile 3 20.7 23.9 17.9 0.7 36.8 100
Quartile 4 22.9 33 19.2 1 23.8 100
Total 19 27.9 22.4 1.1 29.6 100
Note:
1.Foreign refers to foreign collaborators, foreign institutional investors, foreign OCBs, foreign others and 
     NRIs.
2.Government refers to all public financial institutions, including central and state banks.
3.Corporate refers to promoters, subsidary companies and holding companies.
4.Directors refers to directors and relatives.
5.Public refers to general public companies.
Source: Singh, Singh and Weisse  (2003)  26
 
Table 3.  How concentrated is family control?
Country Average number    % of total value of listed corporate assets % of GDP
of firms per family            that families control (1996) 1996
Top 1 Top 5 Top 10 Top 15 Top 15
family families families families families
Hong Kong 2.36 6.5 26.2 32.2 34.4 84.2
Indonesia 4.09 16.6 40.7 57.7 61.7 21.5
Japan 1.04 0.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.1
Korea 2.07 11.4 29.7 36.8 38.4 12.9
Malaysia 1.97 7.4 17.3 24.8 28.3 76.2
Philippines 2.68 17.1 42.8 52.5 55.1 46.7
Singapore 1.26 6.4 19.5 26.6 29.9 48.3
Taiwan 1.17 4.0 14.5 18.4 20.1 17.0
Thailand 1.68 9.4 32.2 46.2 53.3 39.3
Note: Newly asembled data for 2,980 publicly traded corporations (including both financial and non-financial
institutions).  The data was collected from Worldscope and supplemented with information from country-specific
sources.  In all cases, we collect the ownership structure as of the end of fiscal year 1996 or the closest possible 
date.  The "average number of firms per family" refers only to firms in the sample.  To avoid discrepancies in the cross-
country comparison due to different sample coverage, we have scaled down the control holdings of each family group
in the last four columns by assuming that the firms missing from our sample are not controlled by any of the largest
15 families.  The percent of total GDP is calculated using market capiotalization and GDP data from the World Bank.
Source: Claessens et al. (2000), p.108.  27
Table 4: The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets during the  
1980s   
 




Brazil  56.4  36.0  7.7 
India  40.5  19.6  39.9 
Jordan  66.3  22.1  11.6 
Malaysia  35.6  46.6  17.8 
Mexico  24.4  66.6  9.0 
Pakistan  74.0  1.7  24.3 
Republic of Korea 19.5  49.6  30.9 
Thailand   27.7  NA  NA 
Turkey  15.3  65.1  19.6 
Zimbabwe  58.0  38.8  3.2 
All  38.8  39.3  20.8 
F
1  20.0*  31.4*  21.2* 
F
2  16.69*  18.93*  6.38* 
 
Note:  
1.  F-statistic for comparison of means across countries. ‘*’ implies rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the equality of means 
2.  Bartlett-Box F-statistic for  variance across countries. ‘*’  implies rejection of  the  null 
hypothesis of equality of variance. 
3.  External finance LTD refers to long-term debt. The accounting identity, which is the basis 
of the figures in this table, ensures that the total growth of net assets equals the sum of 
internal and external sources of financing growth. The external sources are subdivided into: 
(a) new equity issues, and (b) long-term debt. 
Source: Singh (1995) 
 
 
Table  5:    Net  sources  of  finance  for  Germany,  Japan,  U.K.  and  U.S.,  1970–1989 
(percentages) 
 
  Germany  Japan  U.K.  U.S. 
Internal  80.6  69.3  97.3  91.3 
Bank finance  11.0  30.5  19.5  16.6 
Bonds  -0.6  4.7  3.5  17.1 
New equity  0.9  3.7  -10.4  -8.8 
Trade Credit  -1.9  -8.1  -1.4  -3.7 
Capital transfers  8.5  -  2.5  - 
Other  1.5  -0.1  -2.9  -3.8 
Statistical adj.  0.0  0.0  -8.0  -8.7 
 
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson (1994) 
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Table 6: Financing of corporate growth in 1995-2000* 
 
Developed Markets  Liabilities  Ext F.  Int F.    Emerging Markets  Liabilities  Ext F.  Int F. 
AUSTRALIA  58%  32%  11%    ARGENTINA  46%  16%  38% 
AUSTRIA  52%  3%  45%    BRAZIL  74%  11%  15% 
BELGIUM  56%  6%  38%    CHILE  44%  33%  23% 
BERMUDA  41%  23%  36%    COLOMBIA  73%  16%  11% 
CANADA  56%  32%  12%    CZECH   33%  21%  46% 
CAYMAN 
ISLANDS 
90%  8%  2%    HONG KONG  44%  20%  35% 
DENMARK  72%  6%  23%    HUNGARY  28%  1%  71% 
FINLAND  53%  26%  22%    INDIA  53%  5%  43% 
FRANCE  61%  7%  31%    INDONESIA  110%  12%  -23% 
GERMANY  62%  5%  33%    ISRAEL  54%  6%  40% 
GREECE  52%  34%  14%    KOREA  27%  48%  25% 
IRELAND  76%  5%  18%    MALAYSIA  40%  18%  42% 
ITALY  68%  5%  27%    MEXICO  61%  30%  10% 
JAPAN  62%  6%  32%    PHILIPPINES  34%  17%  49% 
NETHERLANDS  65%  9%  26%    SOUTH AFRICA  49%  10%  41% 
NORWAY  50%  23%  27%    TAIWAN  59%  40%  1% 
SINGAPORE  66%  15%  19%    THAILAND  74%  11%  15% 
1 SPAIN  68%  -9%  40%    TURKEY  61%  18%  21% 
SWEDEN  57%  4%  39%    VENEZUELA  27%  54%  19% 
SWITZERLAND  54%  7%  39%           
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
52%  21%  27%           
UNITED STATES  47%  21%  32%           
                 
Group Average  53%  17%  30%      35%  39%  27% 
                 
Global Average  49%  22%  29%           
 
 
Filter: Companies are excluded if any of their ratios are outside [-200,+200] 
Sample Size: 3360 
 
*  The basis of figures in this table is the same as that for Table 4. The only   difference is that instead 
of net assets, this table considers corporate growth in terms of percentage change in total assets. The 
latter is decomposed into growth of liabilities, of equity finance and that of internal finance. 
 
1 Spain has 18 companies, one of which experienced a small decline in total assets over 1995-00.  
That company also saw external equity increase, which resulted in a large negative value for the 
external equity ratio.  Excluding that one company the sample mean of the ratio is 3%; the internal 
equity ratio would decline accordingly. 
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Table 7:  Developing countries: mean values of λi and proportion 
of significantly positive and significantly negative YiLR 
                 
   Mean λi     Positive YiLR      Negative YiLR  
           
Brazil  0.013    1 / 56    3 / 56 
           
India  0.229    2 / 40    4 / 40 
           
Jordan  0.348    1 / 17    0 / 17 
           
Korea  0.323    7 / 82    2 / 82 
           
Malaysia  0.349    4 / 62    7 / 62 
           
Mexico  0.222    0 / 39    0 / 39 
           
Zimbabwe  0.421    0 / 40    4 / 40 
                 
           
Source: Glen, Lee and Singh (2002) 
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Table 8:  Persistence of Profitability Studies for Industrial Countries     
                 









           
Geroski and Jacquemin 
(1988)  UK  1947-77  29  51  0.488 
  France  1965-82  18  55  0.412 
  Germany  1961-81  21  28  0.410 
           
Schwalbach et al. (1989)  Germany  1961-82  22  299  0.485 
           
Mueller (1990)  US  1950-72  23  551  0.183 
           
Cubbin and Geroski (1990)  UK  1948-77  30  243  0.482 
           
Khemani and Shapiro 
(1990)  Canada  1964-82  19  129  0.425 
           
Odagiri and Yamawaki 
(1990)  Japan  1964-82  19  376  0.465 
           
Schohl (1990)  Germany  1961-81  21  283  0.509 
           
Waring (1996)  US  1970-89  20  12,986  0.540 
                 
           
Source: Goddard and Wilson (1999)         
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Table 9: Statistics on Long-Run Profitability: Advanced Country 
Corporations 
           
  (1)    (2) 
  
Positive 
YiLR    
Negative 
YiLR 
       
United Kingdom 1951-77  37  (15.2)    37   (15.2) 
(243 firms)       
       
United States 1950-72  125   (22.7)    149   (27.0) 
(551 firms)       
       
United States 1964-80  66   (16.0)    137   (33.2) 
(413 firms)       
       
Sweden 1967-85  7   (16.2)    8   (18.6) 
(43 firms)       
       
Canada 1968-82  33   (20.5)    23   (14.3) 
(161 firms)       
       
Fed. Rep. of Germany 1961-82  53   (18.3)    50   (17.2) 
(290 firms)       
       
France 1965-82  NA    NA 
(450 firms)       
       
Japan 1964-82  62   (16.5)    56   (14.9) 
(376 firms)       
           
       
Note: Figures in brackets are percentages.     
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Table 10:  Median Return on Assets (%) by Country and Year (Inflation adjusted) 
 
  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994 
JAPAN  5.5  3.7  1.7  2.0  4.5  4.3  2.8 
SINGAPORE  5.8  6.8  5.1  3.9  5.6  5.2  5.1 
HONG KONG  10.0  9.5  0.6  0.4  2.1  -1.5  0.3 
INDIA  5.0  2.8  -7.8  -0.6  -0.1  -0.1  -1.2 
INDONESIA  -11.1  -13.3  -55.7  -5.1  0.2  -2.1  -0.3 
KOREA  4.0  5.3  -4.5  -0.9  -0.1  0.5  -1.4 
MALAYSIA  5.2  2.4  -2.3  4.4  5.3  5.5  4.7 
PHILIPPINES  2.5  -3.1  -5.8  -0.9  1.2  1.5  -0.2 
TAIWAN  5.1  6.4  3.3  6.1  5.8  4.0  5.1 
THAILAND  5.5  5.6  0.5  -11.4  1.5  2.3  3.3 
Group  Median  (Crisis 
countries) 
4.6  3.9  -3.4  -3.0  0.9  1.4  1.5 
Group Median 
(Non-crisis countries) 
5.0  3.8  -1.4  -0.1  1.7  1.5  0.9 
               
               
 
Source: Extracted from Glen and Singh (2003)  33
Table 11: Median Return on Equity (%) by Country and Year (Inflation Adjusted) 
 
  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994 
JAPAN  7.4  5.4  2.9  4.1  7.1  6.6  4.6 
SINGAPORE  9.3  10.7  8.4  7.9  9.3  9.0  8.7 
HONG KONG  14.0  14.0  5.0  6.6  9.0  3.2  7.9 
INDIA  11.1  9.2  -2.8  5.0  7.0  10.3  7.2 
INDONESIA  -39.0  11.9  -54.2  -5.2  8.5  6.7  7.1 
KOREA  8.0  10.8  -0.5  2.2  4.5  6.4  4.4 
MALAYSIA  8.9  7.1  -0.2  9.5  11.7  12.5  11.6 
PHILIPPINES  5.9  -2.9  -1.7  1.3  3.6  11.1  1.1 
TAIWAN  7.5  10.2  5.5  10.8  10.1  7.2  7.5 
THAILAND  12.9  10.4  15.9  -19.2  6.5  10.1  9.7 
Group  Median  (Crisis 
countries) 
8.5  10.6  -0.4  -1.6  7.5  8.4  8.4 
Group Median 
(Non-crisis countries) 
8.4  9.7  4.0  5.8  8.1  8.1  7.4 
 
Source: Extracted from Glen and Singh (2003) 
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Notes 
 
1 There are also microeconomic studies based on household surveys on poverty 
and related issues. For an insightful review of this literature, see the excellent 
textbook by Bardhan and Urdy (1999).  However, despite its title “Development 
Microeconomics”, the book does not discuss developing country corporations. 
2 However, as explained in Section II and III below there has been a great deal 
more research on these subjects since the Asian crisis. 
3 Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, February 13, 1998. 
4 The then managing director of the IMF, Mr Camdessus (IMF, 1998b), 
observed in relation to South Korea, ‘In Korea, for example, opacity had 
become systemic. The lack of transparency about government, corporate and 
financial sector operations concealed the extent of Korea’s problems – so much 
so that corrective action came too late and ultimately could not prevent the 
collapse of market confidence, with the IMF finally being authorised to 
intervene just days before potential bankruptcy’. See also not 7 below. 
5 Developing countries would regard the title Development Round to be a 
misnomer in the light of the progress made in the negotiations so far. 
6 See Domowitz, Glen and Madhava, (2001); Glen, Lee and Singh (2001,2002); 
Singh (2002c, 2003a); Glen and Singh (2003). 
7 In broad terms the suggested reforms included: 
Financial and Corporate Sector Reforms 
·  Liberalization of foreign investment in domestic banks (Korea, Indonesia 
and Thailand). 
·  The introduction of more stringent conditions for official liquidity support 
(Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). 
·  Restructuring of domestic and external corporate debt (Indonesia, Korea 
and Thailand? And closure of nonviable firms (Korea). 
Competition and Governance Policies 
·  Establishment of competitive procedures for privatisation of government 
assets and for procurement (Indonesia; planned in Malaysia and 
Thailand). 
·  Announcement of bans on or limits to the public funds to bail out private 
corporations (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand). 
·  Introduction or strengthening of bankruptcy laws and exit policies 
(Indonesia, Korea and Thailand).   35
 
·  Strengthening of corporate disclosure standards (Korea) 
·  Liberalization of foreign investment in ownership and management in 
sectors other than the financial sector (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand). 
8 The role of the World Bank has been ambiguous as the Bank’s then Chief 
Economist, Professor Joseph Stiglitz formed a rather different view of the crisis 
than that of the IMF. However, as Wade and Veneroso (1998) suggest, 
Professor Stiglitz’s dissent was not shared by the World Bank’s operational 
staff who carried out much the same reform program that the IMF did. Thus the 
World Bank (1998): “The main lesson from the East Asian crisis is that it is 
important to take an integrated approach to the issues of corporate governance 
and financing. The poor system of corporate governance has contributed to the 
present financial crisis by shielding the banks, financial companies, and 
corporations from market discipline. Rather than ensuring internal oversight and 
allowing external monitoring, corporate governance has been characterized by 
ineffective boards of directors, weak internal control, unreliable financial 
reporting, lack of adequate disclosure, lax enforcement to ensure compliance, 
and poor audits. These problems are evidenced by unreported losses and 
understated liabilities.” This is not much different from the Greenspan-Summers 
IMF analysis. 
9 Other contributors to the structural thesis include Summers (2000), Phelps 
(1999), IMF (1997) and US Council for Economic Advisers (1998,1999). For 
an implicit or explicit critique of the structuralist thesis see Chang (2000), 
Sakakibara (2001), Stiglitz (1999), Wade and Veneroso (1998) Sachs and 
Radelet (1998), Singh and Weisse (1999) and Jomo (2001). 
10 The Johnson et al (2000) study suggesting that the decline in stock market 
valuation of firms as well as currency depreciations in Asian crisis countries 
were directly related to poor corporate governance; broadly supports the 
conclusions of the structuralist theory. 
11 For differing perspectives on the causes, consequences and remedies of the 
financial crisis in East Asian countries, see three recent collections of articles 
published by National Bureau of Economic Research: Feldstein (2002), Dooley 
and Frankel (2002), Edwards and Frankel (2002). 
12 In Korea this was due to its membership of OECD. In 1991 the government 
dissolved its planning office. In Thailand financial liberalisation was instituted 
in order to bolster Thailand’s claim to be the financial centre of the East. Chang 
(2000), Singh (1999a).   36
 
13 On the competition policy controversy between emerging and advanced 
countries at the WTO, see Singh (2002c), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001). 
14 The main references in relation to this new information include, Claessens et 
al (2000), Iskander and  Chamlou (2000), La Porta et al (1999) and Singh, 
Singh and Weisse (2003) 
15 See also Johnson et al. (2000) on this point. 
16 The tables have been extracted from Glen and Singh’s (2003) large study of 
corporate finance in emerging and mature markets referred to earlier. 
17 All the data pertain to public companies listed on the stock markets in each 
country, equity finance therefore, refers to the resources obtained from the stock 
market through new issues, including rights issues. See also Domowitz, Glen 
and Madhaven (2001) 
18 Donaldson’s (1961) classic contribution provided the empirical bases for the 
‘pecking order’ theory for large US corporations. He ascribed the phenomenon 
essentially to the relative transactions costs of different sources of finance and 
to managerial control of the corporations. 
19 There is no necessary contradiction between Asian corporations generally 
being family controlled while raising a large portion of their resources for 
growth from the stock market. Family control in the case of large corporations, 
as indicated in the previous section, arises from the fact that although family 
ownership is often much less than 50%, the financial institutions (which have 
considerable ownership and often are government-owned or influenced) 
generally back the founding families to allow them to maintain control over the 
corporations. Moreover families use various pyramiding devices to maintain 
and expand their control over very large corporations.  
20 For recent reviews see Hughes (1991); Mueller (1997); Tichy (2001); Singh 
(2000).  
21 For a full analysis of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Singh (1997, 
1998, 2000) and Singh and Weisse (1998). 
22 This section is based on Singh (2002a) and Glen, Lee and Singh (2002) 
23  For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Singh (2002a); Glen, Lee and 
Singh (2002).  
24 As noted in Section III.I, the change of the normalising variable alters the 
nature of the association between crony capitalism and crisis, this association 
cannot be regarded as being robust.     37
 
25 For the fuller discussion of these issues, see the references provided in 
Section IV 
26 See further Kindleberger (1984) and Greenspan (1998) 
27 See further Furman and Stiglitz (1999) and Stiglitz (1999) 
28 See further Kaufman (2000) and Williamson (2002) 
29 See further Stiglitz (1999); Singh and Zammit (2000); see, however, 
Summers (2000) 
30 The last contribution suggests that rather than being an abrupt change in 
direction it has been a gradual process. 
31 This subject is discussed in detail in Singh (2002b).  
32 The data are based on cross-sectional analysis of the ownership structure of 
the 20 largest firms by capitalisation in 27 countries using a 20% threshold for 
control.   38
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